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SPILL-OVER REPUTATION: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
INDIA & THE UNITED STATES 
Srividhya Ragavan1 
INTRODUCTION 
Spill-over reputation is the concept wherein the fame or 
reputation of a trademark in one jurisdiction spills into a second 
jurisdiction and gives rise to the issue of protectability in the second 
jurisdiction.  For example, Starbucks is a famous trademark in the 
United States.  The mark is also well-known in other jurisdictions.  
Let us assume that Starbucks Corporation operates no stores in Utopia 
nor is the mark registered there.  Thus, Starbucks, as a mark, has no 
presence in Utopia.  Soon, a local Utopian opens a store under the 
name Starbucks to sell star-shaped candies.  Starbucks Corporation 
objects to the same on the grounds that many Utopians associate 
Starbucks with the American entity.  Alternately, there may be 
situations where an American traveller to Utopia, sees a locally 
famous mark.  On return, the American traveller uses that Utopian 
mark commercially within the US and registers it for under the 
Lanham Act.  This action prevents the owner of the well-known 
Utopian mark from expanding into the US market although the mark 
maybe known to American travellers to Utopia.  Protection for and 
recognition of such marks involve national legal question that have 
international implications. 
Basic principles of trademark law dictate that the first to use 
a trademark in commerce has priority to trademark rights.  This is 
termed as the “priority rule.” Still, trademarks law, like other areas of 
intellectual property law is territorial in nature.2  That is, the right to 
                                                                                                               
 1 The author is a Professor of Law at the Texas A&M University School of Law. 
Ragavan sincerely acknowledges and thanks Ms. Latha R Nair of K&S Partners, New Delhi, 
India for providing details about the relevant Indian cases on the subject of trans-border 
reputation, though all opinions expressed regarding Indian case law and the legal position in 
this paper are that of the author alone. 
 
 2 See James Faris, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in 
American Trademark Law, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 451, 454–55 (2009) (discussing the 
territorial nature of trademarks law). 
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the mark is limited to the territory in which the mark is either used or 
registered in, as the case is.  In all, priority to the rights in the mark is 
limited to the defined geographic area of use (territory of use) of the 
mark under the territoriality principle.3  The geographic limits on a 
trademark have always been tied to the use of the mark in the 
territory, especially when the mark is unregistered.  Basically, when 
a mark is registered, it confers the right to use the mark in the territory 
of the country in which it is registered. 
The territoriality doctrine essentially means that trademark 
rights are national in nature; that is trademark rights of an owner exist 
within the national boundaries of each country and are subject to 
national laws unless an international application, as required, has 
been filed.  Thus, the right to a trademark registered within the United 
States does not extend beyond the borders of the United States.  By 
corollary, it means that a third party can rightfully use a name or logo 
registered within the US in a third country.  Thus, Panera Bread can 
be registered in the US by Owner A; in Brazil, the same name can be 
registered by a third party for the same or similar products assuming 
Owner A has not first registered it in Brazil.  The issue with the 
territoriality doctrine arises with marks whose reputation is global.  
Taking the McDonalds example, the mark has global reputation and 
brand identity even in countries where it does not have a registered 
presence.  Under these circumstances, what happens if a casual 
tourist, Tourist A—who visits the United States decides to use the 
name in his home country—say, Timbaktu, where the name is not 
registered, but may be well-known. 
Typically, if Tourist A is the first to register the name in 
Timbaktu, then he will have the rights to it within Timbaktu by virtue 
of the priority doctrine, but, this result may not be fair for globally 
well-known marks such as Coco-Cola, McDonalds, Apple and such 
others.  For such  marks, the question of whether priority of local use 
becomes irrelevant if there is territorial reputation is an important 
question by creating a famous foreign mark exception to territoriality. 
This paper compares India’s position with that of the US on 
the question of protection of well-known marks in the light of 
applicable international legal prescriptions. The discussion in this 
paper compares protection for famous foreign marks (as opposed to 
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a famous mark). Famous foreign marks are those that have acquired 
fame in one country and hence, well-known in another country.4  
Thus, Part I of this paper discusses international prescriptions relating 
to the protection in one jurisdiction of a trademark which is 
considered well-known in another under the former’s national 
trademark law.  Part II outlines the Indian position and precedents 
relating to well-known trademarks while Part III outlines the 
governing Lanham Act provisions and the judicial posture on foreign 
trademarks in the United States.  The conclusion highlights the 
presence of a disconnect between the position of the United States 
vis-à-vis other countries on the subject and its local posture on the 
question of protection of well-known trademarks. 
Part I 
The International Prescriptions 
This part sets the tone to fully comprehend the competing 
principles and doctrines that apply under the international intellectual 
property regime when a trademark that has achieved fame in one 
jurisdiction is sought to be used by a third party in another part of the 
world. 
Typically, protection for trademarks are extended territorially 
in each country to marks that are either used or registered within the 
territory.  With globalization, trademarks become well-known and 
                                                                                                               
 4 International conventions such as the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement 
defines protection for well-known marks. These are marks which enjoys a trans-border 
reputation in a jurisdiction in which the product or service is not market. See Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, revised at the Stockholm Revision 
Conference, art. 6(bis), July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]; see also TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, art. 15, Apr. 15, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4UR-RT9Q] [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Famous marks 
are those that enjoy a wide-recognition even within a jurisdiction such that its reputation and 
its distinctiveness to function as a source identifier is stronger than a typically registered 
mark. Within the United States, famous marks are protected as part of Trademarks Dilution 
Act, 2006. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 
Stat. 1730; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)).The distinction being that famous marks enjoy a 
higher level of protection within the United States but these are marks that have acquired 
fame within the US. Thus, the famous marks of United States are not necessarily the well-
known marks, which has spill-over reputation from use in another jurisdiction. The 
discussion in this paper is about famous foreign marks which are marks that have acquired 
fame in one country and hence, well-known in another country. 
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gain fame even in jurisdictions where goods or services that bear the 
mark are not marketed.5  Under these circumstances, the question is 
whether, and should, trademarks well-known in one jurisdiction be 
entitled to protection to prevent third parties from appropriating the 
fame of the mark by capitalizing on the lack of territorial protection 
in a different jurisdiction.  The fame of well-known marks has 
challenged the traditional notions within which we couch trademarks 
law, namely, that protection is extended territorially to protect market 
integrity.6 
Two important international treaties outline the legal 
protection of well-known marks at a multilateral level.  These treaties 
recognize the importance of protection of trademarks whose fame 
goes beyond the territory of the mark’s use and registration. 
a) Paris Convention 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, 1883 (“Paris Convention”), as amended, addresses the use 
of well-known marks under Article 6 (bis).7  Under this Article, 
member states can legislatively provide for interested parties to reject, 
cancel the registration, or prohibit the use of trademarks which are 
confusingly similar to a well-known mark.8  The Convention has no 
specific definition of a well-known trademark except that the Article 
indicates that it may constitute: 
                                                                                                               
 5 Clark W. Lackert & Maren C. Perry, Protecting Well-known and Famous Marks: A 
Global Perspective, BUILDING AND ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUE 2008 (King 
& Spalding 2008), http://www.buildingipvalue.com/08_global/63-66kingspalding.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U649-JRJN]. 
 6 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006), 
which outlines protection of famous marks. Under this statute, marks are considered famous 
if they fulfill number of statutorily established factors. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125 for the 
definition of fame. Factors such as distinctiveness of the mark, the duration and extent of use 
of the mark, the duration and extent of publicity of the mark, the geographical trading area 
in which the mark is used, the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the 
mark is used, the degree of recognition of the mark, channels of trade, the nature and extent 
of use of the same or similar marks by third parties, registration status of the mark are 
examples of factors that are considered towards determining whether a mark is famous under 
Title 15 in the United States. Allan P. Hillman, Trademark Dilution: The Fame Game, THE 
CONN. L. TRIB. (Dec. 2006), https://shipmangoodwin.com/files/Publication/9b084099-2c37-
4ff1-a1d4-03552f7c019f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d2b31cfe-f91b-4664-8ca4-
07fc18de3b50/trademark_dilution.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4RQ-GGA7]. 
 7 Paris Convention, art. 6. 
 8 Id. 
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“a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to 
create confusion of a mark considered by the 
competent authority of the country of registration or 
use to be well-known in that country as being already 
the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this 
Convention and used for identical or similar goods.” 
9 
The standard under the Paris Convention seems to be that the 
mark, already in use in a third country, should be well-known in the 
country of registration such that a strong likelihood of confusion 
would result if the mark were to be registered in the third country for 
use over identical or similar products.  Paris Convention did not 
elaborate or define the extent of fame required for a mark to be well-
known nor does it outline any limits or criterion to determine when a 
mark can be considered well-known.10  Thus, the question of how 
much fame is required for a mark to be well-known was never 
addressed under the Convention and was thus presumably left to 
every sovereign member state to determine the outer limits of fame.  
Further, the use of the terms “identical or similar goods” limited the 
scope of protection of the well-known marks doctrine to goods under 
the Paris Convention.11  It left service marks uncovered. 
b) TRIPS Agreement 
When the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
established,12  Article 2 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
                                                                                                               
 9 Id. See also Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, The Mgmt. 
Of Internet Names And Addresses: Intell. Prop. Issues (Apr. 30, 1999), 
https://archive.icann.org/en/wipo/FinalReport_4.html [https://perma.cc/X8E2-SPPE] 
(discussing the special protections needed for famous foreign marks nd well-known marks). 
 10 Stylianos Malliaris, Protecting Famous Trademarks: Comparative Analysis of US 
and EU Diverging Approaches—The Battle Between Legislatures and the Judiciary: Who 
Is the Ultimate Judge? 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 45, 48, 50 (2010). 
 11 Id. Separately, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) has been 
working towards establishing a treaty addressing protection of well-known and famous 
foreign trademarks. Thus, a Standing Committee was established to deal with issues such as 
determining when a mark becomes well-known. See World Intellectual Property 
Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs And 
Geographical Indications, First Session (1998),  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/sct_1/sct_1_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C47M-QQ4L] 
[hereinafter Standing Committee]. 
 12 Id. 
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of Intellectual Property Rights (“the TRIPs Agreement”) 
incorporated all substantive provisions of the Paris Convention.13  In 
turn, protection of trademark rights under the Paris Convention was 
extended to all WTO member-states.  Article 16(2) of the TRIPs 
Agreement addressed well-known trademarks.14  In general, Article 
16 of TRIPs made important changes to the protection regime for 
well-known marks.  First, the TRIPs Agreement vested the 
mandatory obligation on member states to statutorily provide for 
owners of a registered trademark the exclusive right to prevent the 
use by unauthorized third parties from using “identical or similar” 
marks over “goods or services” in a manner resulting in likelihood of 
confusion with a registered trademark.15  Thus, the TRIPs Agreement 
specifically included service marks, which was originally not 
included under the Paris Convention.16  That is, Article 16 of the 
TRIPs Agreement specifically elaborates that “Article 6bis of the 
Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to services.”17  
Second, Article 16(2) of the TRIPs Agreement lists factors that a 
member state may consider to determine whether a mark is “well-
known.”18  Such factors include knowledge of the trademark of one 
member in the relevant sector of the public, as a result of the 
promotion of the trademark, in another member state.19  The Article 
specifies that use of the mark within the territory is not considered as 
a pre-requisite of knowledge of the mark although it indicates 
“promotion of the mark” within the territory is required.20  Third, 
Article 16(3) expanded the scope of application of well-known marks 
to goods or services that are not similar to those in respect of which a 
trademark is registered, provided that: (i) the goods or services over 
which the trademark is applied need not be identical or related; and 
(ii) there is no need for proof of likelihood of public confusion.21  That 
                                                                                                               
 13 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Annex 1C. 
 14 Id. art. 16. 
 15 See id. art. 16(2) (stating that “[I]n determining whether a trademark is well-known, 
Members shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the 
public, including knowledge in the Member concerned which has been obtained as a result 
of the promotion of the trademark.”). 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. art. 16(3). 
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is, even when there is no confusion (the test to prove infringement), 
a well-known mark from one jurisdiction cannot be used by another 
party in a second jurisdiction if a connection may be established by 
the public.  Thus, the use of a well-known trademark on a good or 
service can be construed as being violated under two circumstances: 
a) the use falsely indicates a connection between those goods or 
services and the owner of the registered trademark, and b) could likely 
damage the interests of the owner of the registered trademark.22  Note 
that trademarks enjoyed a broader protection when law embraced the 
likelihood of confusion standard, as opposed to actual confusion.  The 
need for a mere showing of a connection with goods and services of 
a well-known mark further broadens the scope of protection of well-
known marks.23  This broadened scope is applied over goods or 
services that are not similar, representing a change from the original 
standard for the use of a mark over “identical or similar” goods to a 
standard that was further broadened to cover “related goods.”  In all, 
the TRIPs Agreement in mandating member states to recognize well-
known marks on goods and services, broadened the scope of 
protection of well-known marks. 
Further, with a view to provide clarity on what constitutes a 
well-known trademark, Article 16 of the TRIPs Agreement notes that 
members shall take into account the knowledge of the trademark “in 
the relevant sector of the public,” including the knowledge obtained 
within the country as a result of the promotion of the trademark.24  In 
not defining what the “relevant public is” this requirement includes 
an element of flexibility and subjectivity in determining what 
constitutes the “relevant public” and whether the “relevant public” 
had knowledge of the mark from the promotion of the mark, which 
presumably refers to advertisements and seems to specifically 
exclude the need for use or registration of the mark in that market.25  
Given the inherent subjectivity outlined in Article 16, ultimately, the 
determination of whether a trademark used or registered in one 
jurisdiction can be considered well-known in another is based on 
national legislations and interpretations of what would constitute 
knowledge of the relevant public.  Additionally, Article 16(2) 
provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances for a competent 
                                                                                                               
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. art. 16(2). 
 25 Id. 
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national authority to define “the relevant public” to ultimately 
determine whether a contested mark is well-known. 
The recommendation for member states from the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) with reference to the term 
“relevant sectors of the public” is that it is broad enough to include 
actual and/or potential consumers, members involved in the channels 
of distribution and business people involved in the type of goods 
and/or services to which the mark applies.26  It is recommended that 
even if the mark is determined to be well-known in at least one 
relevant sector of the public in a Member State, the mark shall be 
considered by the Member State to be a well-known mark.27  That is, 
a Member State may determine that a mark is a well-known mark, 
even if the mark is not otherwise considered to be so known.  The 
WIPO recommendations form a part of the non-binding Joint 
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-
Known Marks of WIPO which is meant to help member countries 
determine factors to protect well-known marks.28  The 
recommendations also define non-exhaustive recommendatory 
factors to determine when a mark can be considered well-known.29 
The international prescriptions underscore the importance of 
having clear national laws to protect well-known marks of the 
subject.  The use of “acquired fame” to determine whether a mark is 
well-known has minimized, although not eliminated, the role of use 
within the jurisdiction as an important indicator to prove fame.  While 
                                                                                                               
 26 World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation Concerning 
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks (Sept. 1999),  
https://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=346 [https://perma.cc/M566-3YBH]; 
see also Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known 
Marks, General Report of the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, 34th Annual 
Meeting, Doc. A/34/16 ¶¶ 171–83 (Sept. 1999). 
 27 World Intellectual Property Organization, Joint Recommendation Concerning 
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, art. 2(2)(b) (Sept. 1999). 
 28 Id. art. 2. 
 29 Id. Under the WIPO Guidelines, a mark may be considered to be well-
known/famous, if one or more of the considerations listed below applies. Such 
considerations include: a) the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the relevant 
sector of the public; b) the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the mark; c) 
the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion of the mark, d) advertising or 
publicity and the presentation, at fairs or exhibitions, of the goods and/or services to which 
the mark applies; e) the duration and geographical area of any registrations, and/or any 
applications for registration of the mark, f) the record of successful and enforcement of rights 
in the mark; g) the extent to which competent authorities recognize the mark and the value 
associated with the mark. Id. art. 2(1)(b). 
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protection is mandated, there is adequate inbuilt flexibility for 
national laws to determine the scope of protection for marks from one 
jurisdiction to qualify for protection in a second jurisdiction based on 
spill-over reputation.  Thus, harmonization notwithstanding, there is 
rightly, a level of variance in national laws and interpretations that 
can lead to different conclusions. 
Part II 
Treatment of Spill-over reputation in India 
In January 1995, India joined the WTO.30  The graduation into 
a WTO member necessitated amendments to India’s intellectual 
property laws including the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958,31 
to comply with India’s obligations under the TRIPs Agreement.32  
Thus, a new Trade Marks Act was enacted in 1999 and entered into 
force in 2003.33  The amended statute harmonized India’s trademarks 
statute with the TRIPs Agreement.  The discussion in this section is 
confined to the requirement of granting protection to well-known 
foreign trademarks and how India has been dealing with issues arising 
therefrom. 
a) Historic Judicial Precedent: Abandonment v. trans-border 
reputation 
Modelled along the lines of the British statute on trademarks, 
the Trade & Merchandise Marks Act of 1958 had no specific 
provision addressing the protection of reputation enjoyed by a mark 
                                                                                                               
 30 India and the WTO, WTO,  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm [https://perma.cc/XBS3-
6DA6] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
 31 The Trade And Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, No. 43, Acts of Parliament, 1958 
(India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1005493/  
[https://perma.cc/TLB8-8CTN] [hereinafter, TMM]. 
 32 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4 (requiring certain protections for intellectual 
property rights). 
 33 See Trade Marks Act, 1999, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India) 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128107 [https://perma.cc/6RV7-CM6S] 
(consolidating trademark law and providing for the protection of trademarks); see also Trade 
Marks Act, 1999 Comes Into Force, THE HINDU (Sept. 16, 2003), 
https://www.thehindu.com/2003/09/16/stories/2003091605991500.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WP6H-LKGY] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). 
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within India if the mark was not used or registered in India.34  That 
said, section 27(2) preserved common law rights of passing off with 
respect to unregistered trademarks, which could be used to fashion 
protection for such marks.35  Considering that the reputation and 
goodwill enjoyed by a mark is a pre-requisite for any passing-off 
action,36 Indian courts dealt with trans-border reputation under 
Section 27(2) of the 1958 legislation. 
Remarkably, in one of the earlier judgments rendered in 
Centron Industrial Alliance Limited & Another v. Gillette UK 
Limited,37 in 1986, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dealt 
with an allegation by Gillette, the plaintiff-respondent, that Centron 
Industrial Alliance Limited and Everkeen Blade Co. infringed its 
trademark on 7O’Clock with respect to safety razor blades.38  Import 
of the 7O’CLOCK razors to India were not permissible post 1958 due 
to restrictions imposed by the Government of India.39  Thus, there 
was a period when the blades were not sold in India by Gillette.  
However, in 1984, Gillette entered into a collaboration agreement 
with an Indian company for manufacture and sale of the razors in 
India.  In 1985, Gillette was notified about an allegedly infringing use 
by the defendants of the mark “7-Up” on safety razors (placed along 
with a clock face with the hands at “7”, which was similar to Gillette’s 
mark). The defendants asserted that that Gillette’s mark 7O’CLOCK 
was not used in India on or after 1958 and that whatever reputation 
and goodwill that existed with respect to any goods thereof must be 
deemed to have been lost by the time the defendants’ razors were put 
in the market.40 
The Court noted that blades were advertised in foreign 
newspapers and magazines extensively and these were circulated in 
India through importation.41  Additionally, the Court considered the 
                                                                                                               
 34 See TMM, supra note 31 (limiting applicability to India). 
 35 Id. § 27(2) which states “Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action 
against any person for passing off goods as the goods of another person or the remedies in 
respect thereof.” 
 36 Id. 
 37 Unreported case. Decided on July 24, 1986 by the Bombay High Court in Appeal 
No. 368 of 1986 by Justices S. K. Desai & S.P. Bharucha, available at  
www.casemine.com/judgement/in/58117eb32713e179478af29e# [https://perma.cc/GUR6-
53RH]. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. ¶ 7. 
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fact that a large number of Indians travel out temporarily to other 
countries and would have had the opportunity to use Gillette’s 
7O’CLOCK branded razors and issued an injunction against the 
defendants.  The defendants raised the issue abandonment on the 
ground that Gillette had either no goodwill in the mark 7O’CLOCK 
because of non-use in India from 1958, or, that goodwill had been 
exhausted from the date of non-use,42 The court, however, opined that 
the mark had not lost its distinctiveness in India on the grounds that: 
“It is not possible for us at this stage at least to accept 
the submission that there was no user at all in India or 
not sufficient user as to amount to destruction or 
abandonment of the plaintiffs’ goodwill and 
reputation.  It is now equally not possible to accept the 
submission that the goods of the plaintiffs had lost 
their distinctiveness and had ceased to be associated 
in the minds of possible consumers with the goods of 
the plaintiffs on account of the policies of the 
Government of India as a result whereof the 
commercial user in India had become restricted.”43 
Typically, abandonment is an important part of trademarks 
jurisprudence.44  The Indian court seems to have considered several 
factors but not whether abandonment by non-use results in loss of 
rights within India.  Nor did it try to define when a mark may be 
considered abandoned.  Instead, the Division Bench of the Bombay 
High Court in yet another occasion held in favor of Gillette regarding 
the very same mark in the 1987 in Kamal Trading Co. & Ors v. 
Gillette UK Limited.45  While the case involved the mark 7 
O’CLOCK, the distinguishing feature was that the mark was adopted 
                                                                                                               
 42 Id. ¶ 6. “Plaintiffs had no goodwill in mark ‘7 O’CLOCK’ as the goods manufactured 
by the plaintiffs are not available in India since 1958 and the goodwill, even if any, stood 
extinguished, while, on the other hand, the defendants acquired goodwill in respect of the 
mark “7 O’CLOCK” from 1982.” See e.g., Emergency One, Inc v. American Fireeagle, Ltd., 
228 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing principles involved in abandonment because of 
non-use in the United States). 
 43 Id. at ¶ 5. 
 44 See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (stating a trademark is deemed abandoned if “its use has been 
discontinued with intent not to resume such use . . . Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be 
prima facie evidence of abandonment. “ “Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such 
mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in mark”). 
 45 Kamal Trading Co. and Ors. v. Gillette U.K. Ltd., (1988) 8 PTC 1 (Del). 
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over dissimilar goods, namely, toothbrushes.  Further, the defendant 
relied on a decision relating to abandonment from the English Courts 
in Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar N P (“Budweiser 
case”)46 where the Court of Appeals in England considered that the 
plaintiff’s sale of Budweiser beer to military and diplomatic 
establishments in England (around 5 million cans) as “sporadic and 
occasional sales.”  Deeming these as not amounting to carrying on 
business in England, plaintiff was refused an injunction against the 
defendant’s use of the same mark.  In India, rejecting the holding of 
the said decision, the Division Bench held as follows:47 
“ . . . it is not possible to conclude that the goodwill or 
the reputation stands extinguished merely because the 
goods are not available in the country for some 
duration. . . .   It is possible that the manufacturers 
may suspend their business activities in a country for 
short duration, but that fact would not destroy the 
reputation or goodwill acquired by the 
manufacturers.”48 
While the decision rightly asserted that “goodwill is not 
limited to a particular country” on account of global sales and trade, 
perhaps the court could have considered the jurisprudence on 
abandonment of a mark.  The decision broadened the goodwill 
concept to countries where the goods not available but are 
presumably known not because they were widely advertised with 
intent to use within the county but because there were general 
advertisements newspapers, periodicals, magazines abroad meant for 
that market.49  The two Gillette decisions’ failure in not drawing a 
clear jurisprudential boundary of when goodwill begins and ends set 
the tone for many of the subsequent cases.  Unfortunately, the 
holdings of these judgment became an important precedent in India. 
Five years later, in 1996, the Supreme Court of India had the 
occasion to decide the issue of trans-border reputation in N R Dongre 
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& Ors v. Whirlpool Corporation.50  The trademark in issue, 
Whirlpool, was registered under the Indian Trademarks Act, 1958.51  
The trademark was used in respect of electrical goods including 
washing machines and owned by Whirlpool Corporation USA.  
While the mark was registered on February 22, 1956 in classes 7, 9 
& 11, the registrations were not renewed after 1977 due to a lapse in 
protection.52  However, despite the lapse in registration, the 
Whirlpool mark was being used in India through sale of washing 
machines to the offices of the US Embassy and USAID offices in 
New Delhi.53  Whirlpool had also advertised its products in various 
publications having circulation in India.54  Furthermore, goods 
bearing the Whirlpool mark were reaching Indian consumers either 
as second-hand products or through indirect channels.55  The 
defendant, an Indian company, applied in 1986 to register the mark 
Whirlpool for the same class of goods and that application was 
granted.56 
The Supreme Court reviewed the findings of the Single Judge 
and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court on the reputation of 
the Whirlpool mark in India.  The court cited the Delhi High Court’s 
position that, “[E]ven advertisement of trade mark without existence 
of goods in the market is also to be considered as use of the trade 
mark.”57  It is also not necessary however that the association of the 
plaintiff’s marks with his goods should be known all over the country 
or to every person in the area where it is known best.”58  Citing 
Faulder & Co. Ltd. v. O & G. Rushton,59 the court held that the facts 
prima facie demonstrate that the respondent was prior user of the 
                                                                                                               
 50 N.R. Dongre and Ors v. Whirlpool Corporation and Anr, (1996) 16 PTC 583 (Del), 
available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1732339/ [https://perma.cc/NL6Z-PL2D] 
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trade mark “WHIRLPOOL” as it was using the same since 1941, 
while the appellants themselves claim the adoption thereof from 1986 
and only within India.60  Thus, the court held that the trade mark 
“WHIRLPOOL” has acquired reputation and goodwill in this country 
and the same has become associated in the minds of the public or 
potential buyers with the goods.61 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of India did not address 
whether not renewing registration for ten years after its expiry 
amounts to abandonment.  If the trademark owner did not protect his 
rights within the territory by continuously renewing the registration, 
then it is unclear why the court felt the need to be sympathetic to a 
careless trademark owner.  Nevertheless, the case is commendable 
established and reiterated the international standard protection of 
trademark rights need not be based on use within the territory.  Yet, 
the court could have perhaps delved into the issue of whether a mark 
that has been intentionally abandoned for ten years can be considered 
by a jurisdiction to have enough accumulated goodwill such that the 
foreign mark owner can take over the goodwill of a territorially 
registered user.  The judgment, arguably, highly diluted the value of 
trademark registration and associations with the territorially doctrine. 
b) Indian Judiciary sets a trend in favoring foreign marks 
The decision of the Indian Supreme Court in the Whirlpool 
decision started a trend that seemed to favor foreign trademark 
owners. It seemed like the High Courts involved and even the 
Supreme Court did not venture into the question of establishing the 
threshold or criterion to fully determine the limits of fame. Nor was 
there any criterion established to distinguish between a use that will 
distinguish a known trademark from a well-known trademark, 
sufficient to qualify as locally well-known or “famous.”  While the 
Whirlpool decision is widely regarded as an attempt to appease the 
United States, the Whirlpool case also became an important precedent 
setting the trend for further expansion of the scope of the recognition 
for trans-border reputation as elaborated below.62  The holding of the 
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Whirlpool case on trans-border reputation was followed in several of 
the subsequent cases decided under the trademarks statute.  The 
decision is perhaps an example of how the judiciary, in seeming good 
faith, but without larger economic justification, has interpreted the 
statute more broadly to accommodate to global trends. 
In line with the precedent that goodwill will be protected even 
if the mark is not used within India, in 1991, a single Judge of the 
Delhi High Court decided a dispute involving Apple Computer Inc. 
v. Apple Leasing and Industries.63  This dispute was brought before 
the court by Apple Computers Inc., (“Apple”), United States, against 
an Indian company.  During that time, Apple had been exporting its 
computers to India since 1977, although primarily to departments of 
the Indian Government.  At that time, Apple had pending trademark 
applications in India for the mark, logo and the mark APPLE 
CENTRE, and hence, the question related to passing-off of a 
reputable foreign mark.  Apple sued an Indian entity which chose to 
call itself, “Apple Computer Education” and made use of a partly 
bitten apple which called to mind the Apple logo.  In its defense, the 
Indian company argued that goodwill alone was not protectable under 
a passing-off action and that the foreign owner is required to conduct 
its business in India.64  Rejecting the argument, the Delhi High Court 
held that in the context of the present day circumstances involving 
the free exchange of information through several media and 
considering the freedom and ability to travel globally a plaintiff 
cannot be expected to carry on business in a jurisdiction before 
improper use of its name or mark can be restrained by the court.65  
Despite the Indian statute being modelled on English law, the court 
was persuaded by opinions on passing-off from other jurisdictions 
such as New Zealand, Australia and Canada to hold that the plaintiff 
had a prima facie case against the defendants from using the words 
“Apple” or “Apple Computers” in the course of the trade of computer 
education.66  In doing so, although much of the judgment discusses 
confusion rather than dilution of a well-known mark, this court 
established that use or conducting business within India was not 
required in order to protect goodwill within India, which comports 
with the international requirements. 
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Similarly, in the 1997 Division Bench decision of the Bombay 
High Court, in Aktiebolaget Volvo of Sweden v. Volvo Steels Ltd. Of 
Gujarat (India)67 noted that trans-border reputation was recognized 
by Indian Courts and that as a matter of law, it was not necessary to 
prove actual sale if the plaintiff was able to prove goodwill and 
reputation of the mark in India.  The plaintiff in that case, a Swedish 
automobile company, who had no business in India at that time, was 
suing a local defendant for unauthorized adoption and use of its 
Volvo mark in respect of mild steel ingots.68  Later, in 2001, a Single 
Judge of the Delhi High Court held in Rainforest Café Inc v. 
Rainforest Café and Ors69 that, although the American corporation, 
Rainforest Café Inc, had no business activity in India, the fact that it 
had received several trade inquiries from India was sufficient to issue 
an injunction against a local defendant who adopted the identical 
mark ‘Rainforest Café: A Wild Place to Eat’ for his restaurant.  The 
Court found that, failure to do so would cause irreparable injury to 
the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiff worldwide besides having 
adverse ramifications on the impending franchise enquiries for New 
Delhi and other parts of India.70  In 2002, another Single Judge of the 
Delhi High Court cited the Whirlpool case and held in favor of the 
American cosmetic company, Jolen Inc, which had no business 
activity in India at that time, by restraining a local defendant who 
adopted an identical mark and get up for identical goods.71 
The judicial trend in favor of trans-border reputation in some 
ways has resulted in courts not delving into the different legal and 
economics questions that are integral to appreciate the threshold and 
limitations of goodwill being spilled-over.  Is there not a difference 
between the goodwill enjoyed in a foreign country of the Apple mark 
on the one hand and other marks such as Rainforest Café and Jolen, 
on the other? Importantly, marks such as Jolen  may not cross the 
threshold of fame  within the US.  Even if Jolen and Rainforest Café 
are considered as famous marks in the US, is the fame not different 
in a country like India where these products are predominantly known 
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to smaller market of people.  Do the courts not have an obligation to 
consider how a “market” should defined in order to determine fame 
and goodwill? 
c) Lost opportunity to underscore the doctrinal split between 
territoriality & fame 
In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court dealt with a case that 
indirectly highlighted the intersection of the famous (foreign) marks 
doctrine with the territoriality requirement.  In Milmet Oftho 
Industries & Ors v. Allergan Inc,72  the Supreme Court rejected an 
appeal from a local defendant who adopted an identical mark 
OCUFLOX for a medicinal preparation.  In doing so, it held that the 
mere fact that the plaintiff had not been using the mark in India would 
be irrelevant if they were the first in the world market.  However, the 
Supreme Court added a note of caution as follows: 
“Multinational corporations, who have no intention of 
coming to India or introducing their product in India 
should not be allowed to throttle an Indian Company 
by not permitting it to sell a product in India, if the 
Indian Company has genuinely adopted the mark and 
developed the product and is first in the market.  Thus 
the ultimate test should be who is first in the 
market.”73 
Despite the note of caution, the court felt that because medical 
practitioners regularly travel abroad and because these goods are 
widely advertised, a product is likely to acquire a worldwide 
reputation.  It would have been nice to see the court delve into what 
constitutes a market for determining goodwill.  Is it the general public 
or the doctors or the smaller percentage of doctors who travel abroad 
or the pharmacists who dispense these medications? 
That said, this case also captured succinctly the conflict 
between determining fame in the context of the territoriality doctrine 
when dealing with famous foreign trademarks.  For the first time, the 
Court indicated that priority of innocent use within India would and 
could supersede trans-border reputation.  This would be the 
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traditional approach wherein even though the mark may be used 
aboard successfully, a prior-user in India who used it in good faith 
should be capable of holding onto the mark successfully.  Otherwise, 
it subjects local users unfairly to foreign corporations and their brand 
investments.74 
d) Post-TRIPS statutory changes and its impact on famous foreign 
trademarks 
Under the 1999 Trade Marks Act, (“the TM Act”), which 
came into effect in 2003, notes that in order to receive protection 
under the statute, read with rules, there is no pre-condition that the 
mark is used or registered in India.75  Importantly, the provisions in 
the Indian TMA do not insist on use of the well-known mark in 
India.76  Section 11(9) of the statute specifically states that the 
Registrar shall not deny protection for a well-known mark on the 
grounds that the trade mark has not been used in India or that the trade 
mark has not been registered in India or that a previous application 
for registration of the trade mark has not been filed in India or that 
the trade mark is not well-known to the public at large in India.77  
Similarly, India does not consider the priority of use within India as 
a criterion in determining fame or for the protection of a  well-known 
foreign mark which seems to be in line with the WIPO joint 
recommendations.78  Traditional trademarks law focused on priority 
of use within the territory.  Given the strong territoriality 
considerations of traditional trademarks law for a prior local user, the 
question of whether famous foreign marks which represent prior 
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foreign users, form an exception territoriality doctrine has not been 
fully expounded and may be left to the courts to consider.  That is, 
should a prior foreign user of a mark famous in that jurisdiction be 
given priority against a first local user of the mark? 
Similarly, section 11(6) thereof lays down non-exhaustive 
criteria for determining a well-known mark.79  Such criteria include 
knowledge or recognition of the mark in the relevant section of the 
public including knowledge in India obtained as a result of promotion 
of the mark, duration, extent and geographical area of use and 
promotion of the mark, duration and geographical extent of the 
registration of the mark and instances of successful enforcement of 
the rights in that trade mark.80  Further, the Registrar shall also 
consider the market for the goods, channels of distribution and “the 
business circles dealing with the goods or services, to which that trade 
mark applies.”81  Thus, since the public at large need not know of a 
well-known mark, it is left to the judiciary to narrow what constitutes 
“relevant public” to determine the extent of fame of the mark. 
In March 2017, India unveiled a new Trademarks Rules. Rule 
12482 allows parties to request the Registrar to determine a trademark 
as well-known by filing a relevant form along with a statement of 
case by including all the evidence and documents relied by the 
applicant in support of his claim.83  However, the Registrar also has 
the power to change that status if circumstances change after 
providing due opportunity of hearing to the concerned party.84  
Notably, the Registrar can request additional documents85 and invite 
oppositions/objections from the general public.86  If the Registrar 
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determines that the mark is well-known, the mark will be published 
in the trademark Journal and included in the list of well-known 
trademarks maintained by the Registrar.87  Under the rules, the Indian 
Trade Marks Office maintained a list of well-known marks which 
were included based on a request by the owners of the marks provided 
they presented valid proof.88  The Trade Marks Office typically 
preferred a court order recognizing the mark as a well-known mark 
as valid proof of fame of the mark.89 This is comparable to the 
Japanese practice of publishing well-known trademarks.90 
Under the new Rules, the trademarks Registrar wields 
extraordinary powers with reference to either graduating or demoting 
a trademark as being well-known.  That said, Registrar is required to 
take into consideration, Sections 11(6) to 11(9) of the TM Act, 
discussed above.  It is also arguable that right of third parties to object 
and the right to appeal perhaps act as limitations on the power of the 
Registrar.  Presumably, there may be marks that may qualify as well-
known under Section 11 (6) of the statute but has either not made it 
to the well-known marks in the list because adequat4 documentation 
was not presented or, because, the Registrar did not think that it would 
qualify despite the documentation.  The status of these marks may 
have to be judicially determined.  Arguably, the statute is TRIPS-plus 
for the recognition of foreign well-known marks on because it does 
not seek promotion of the mark within the territory of India, which is 
a part of the WIPO recommendation.  Thus, the judicial opinions 
under the amended act, discussed below, presents a dichotomy 
between territoriality and priority which has been unresolved until 
recently. 
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e) The intersection between the territoriality and famous mark 
doctrine 
Considering the traditional underpinnings of the territoriality 
doctrine which dictates that prior territorial user gets protection, the 
question typically is whether a prior foreign user be given priority 
against a first local user when dealing with a famous foreign mark? 
In 2006, in Austin Nichols and Co. and Seagram India Pvt. 
Ltd. Vs. Arvind Behl, Jagatjit Industries Ltd.,91 a Single Judge of the 
Delhi High Court considered whether the mark “Blenders Pride” used 
in respect of the whisky manufactured by the plaintiff enjoyed trans- 
border reputation.  Adopted in 1973, the foreign plaintiff had been 
selling the said whisky in over 50 countries worldwide.92  Plaintiff 
asserted that Blenders Pride enjoyed trans-border reputation in India 
on the grounds that between the late 1980s and early 1990s, millions 
of global Indian travelers were exposed to the sale and promotion of 
the whisky.93  The plaintiff’s business in India was set up in 1993 
through a wholly owned subsidiary.  In 2003, ironically the respective 
marks of the plaintiff and the defendant, namely, Blenders Pride, 
were advertised in the same Trade Marks Journal and both the parties 
filed oppositions against each other’s application. The Indian 
Trademarks office granted registration to the defendants in 2004.  In 
2005, the plaintiffs learnt that the defendants had introduced their 
whisky in the Indian market and a suit was filed.  The defendants 
asserted that they were the prior users of the Blenders Pride mark in 
India, thus bringing the question of prior user within the jurisdiction 
versus reputation outside the territory.94  The defendants claimed that 
they were the prior-user within the territory and hence, presumably, 
implicated the question of the famous foreign mark exception to 
territoriality. 
The court cited the Milmet Oftho95 and held that, Blenders 
Pride whisky manufactured by the plaintiffs had the worldwide 
reputation, being available for sale in a large number of countries 
since 1973.  The Court added that the plaintiffs were not using their 
worldwide reputation to throttle an Indian company by not permitting 
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it to sell its product in India; they were only trying to defend their 
worldwide reputation in the Blenders Pride whisky.96  Further, the 
Court pointed out that even if the plaintiffs were not manufacturing 
the said whisky in India, it would be irrelevant. 
Similarly, in 2008, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court 
in Kiran Jogani and Anr. Vs. George V Records, SARL,97 decided 
whether the mark BUDDHA-BAR enjoyed trans-border reputation in 
India.  The respondent-plaintiff owner who first used it as part of a 
music album asserted that it was the first to adopt the name and use 
it in the year 1996 as the name of a restaurant in Paris.98  Further, 
plaintiff asserted that the music albums played at the said restaurant 
by well-known Disco Jockeys were compiled into CDs as they 
became extremely popular and were then sold under the trade mark 
BUDDHA-BAR from the year 1999 onwards.99  The plaintiff also 
claimed extensive worldwide registrations for the said mark in classes 
9 and 41 and argued that its reputation has spread across the world 
and spilled over to India well prior to the adoption of the offending 
mark by the appellant-defendant in 2002 in respect of musical 
records. 100  The defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to 
establish user rights in India and that the first invoice on record dated 
February 21, 2002, a date after the release of the defendant’s album 
in January, 2002.101  In doing so, this court considered, “[W]hat 
would be the best material which the respondent could have produced 
to establish its trans-border reputation?”102  In its wisdom, the court 
felt that “[I]t is not as if there is a motivated article in one newspaper 
or magazine, but the vast coverage given to the restaurant and the 
music in international press and the magazines including 
transmission of programs through television channels to show even 
the participation of Indian designers.”103  Based in this, the Court 
found merit in the claims of the plaintiff-appellant and upheld the 
trans-border reputation in its mark BUDDHA-BAR. 
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Similarly, in Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma GMBH v. 
Premchand,104 decided in 2013, the trademarks in dispute before a 
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court were “MUCOSOLVAN” and 
“MUCOSOLVIN”, used in respect of their respective cough syrups.  
The plaintiff, a German company established in the year 1845, who 
had been conducting its business in India through its subsidiary, 
claimed that its mark “MUCOSOLVAN” was adopted in 1975 and 
that it has been using it continuously since 1979.105  The plaintiff 
asserted trans-border reputation in the mark and claimed that it was 
the first to adopt and use the said mark anywhere in the world. It had 
a pending application in India at the time of filing the suit.106  The 
plaintiff was aggrieved when it learned in 2011 about the defendant’s 
use of the mark MUCOSOLVIN for a cough syrup.107  The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant, being in the same business was aware of 
the goodwill and reputation of its trademark MUCOSOLVAN and its 
use of the said mark since 1979.108 
Resisting the suit, the defendants argued that the plaintiff has 
not used its trademark “MUCOSOLVAN” in India till the date of the 
suit and that its pending trademark application filed in October, 2011 
was on an ‘intention to use’ basis.  Rejecting the arguments of the 
defendant, the Court considered “other factors” and relied on Milmet 
Oftho Industries.109  It noted that Supreme Court observed that the 
mere fact that the plaintiff was not using the mark in India would be 
irrelevant if they were first in the world market.  The court was 
enamored and seemingly blinded by the fact that plaintiff held a 
registration for the mark MUCOSOLVAN in as many as 93 
countries, and that the Plaintiff’s MUCOSOLVAN products are 
available worldwide! 
Other cases include a 2016 Division Bench decision of the 
Delhi High Court decided the issue of trans-border reputation of the 
mark, Lavera Mac Personal Care Pvt Ltd & Ors v. Laverana 
GMBH.110  ‘LAVERA’ is a Latin word meaning ‘the truth’.  The 
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respondent-plaintiff, a German company, had adopted the mark 
LAVERA in 1980 for cosmetic products and has been marketing 
these products since the year 1982.  The plaintiff claims extensive 
registrations around the world and a pending registration in India at 
the time of filing the suit.  It was the plaintiff’s claim that due to such 
extensive worldwide use, its products sold under the same mark has 
earned goodwill and reputation, that its products are freely available 
on e-bay and online stores, that it has country code top level domain 
name registrations in various countries.  The appellant-defendants on 
the other hand, argued that the plaintiff had never used the mark in 
India and that they had been using the mark since 2005 although it 
was not registered, which made the court believe that the adoption of 
the name was dishonest.  The defendants claimed that they adopted 
the identical mark LAVERA from the aloe vera plant used in beauty 
treatment.111  The Single Judge had held in favor of the plaintiff by 
noting that the existence of a merchant on a webpage of foreign origin 
is sufficient to show the trans-border reputation even if it had no 
activity in India at the relevant time.  The court felt that the growth of 
the internet and the modern means of communication made it 
relatively easier to establish international reputation and its spill-over 
effects. 112 
Overall, the decisions from Indian courts have exhaustively 
considered the issue of whether the plaintiff was “prior in use in the 
world.”  In doing so, India seems to have created a famous foreign 
mark exception to the territoriality doctrine.  In doing so, other 
considerations such as the threshold and limitations of goodwill, the 
larger economic considerations, the territoriality doctrine’s protection 
for registered trademarks and good-faith deservedly need closer 
consideration and scrutiny.  Typically, as discussed below using the 
United States is an example, prior-users within a country, especially 
if they are registered users, will get protection unless the use was 
clearly dishonest or of the fame of the mark vastly overweighs such 
use.  The tension with the territoriality doctrine (that is, protection for 
the prior territorial user) has generally resulted in famous foreign 
marks not be considered as an exception when a local prior territorial 
user is prevalent.  Indian judiciary did not get into this question until 
the Prius judgment discussed below. 
                                                                                                               
 111 Id. at ¶ 3. 
 112 Id. ¶¶ 1516. 
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Part IV 
United States & Well-known Trademarks 
The following segment outlines how the United States treats 
famous foreign marks.  The discussion deals with situations wherein 
a famous foreign mark, well-known locally in the foreign country, is 
used America for the first time within the United States.  The segment 
examines whether it becomes more complicated if the mark is 
registered by the local-user, thus becoming a prior-registered-user of 
a famous foreign mark within the US.  The question when and if the 
original foreign user/owner of the mark wants to use the mark in the 
United States, is whether fame abroad should be an exception to 
territoriality to establish priority of use. 
a) Intersections of Fame within priority & territoriality 
In the United States, as discussed earlier, the first to use a 
trademark in commerce has priority to trademark rights under the 
“priority rule.”  United Drug Co., v. Theodore Rectanus Co.113 
discusses the limits of geographic use with reference to unregistered 
marks.  Two different parties used the same trademark, Rex, in two 
different locations for over 25 years. The products over which the 
mark was used was different although related, considering that one 
used it on medicines to treat dyspepsia and the other used it on blood 
purifiers.  Since both users had used it for several years, the rule of 
priority did not truly help either of the users.  Considering this, the 
Supreme Court held that geographic limits circumscribed the rule of 
priority provided the use was made in good faith.  The court outlined 
that “where two parties independently are employing the same mark 
upon goods of the same class, but in separate markets wherein one is 
wholly remote from the other, the question of prior appropriation is 
legally insignificant, unless at least it appears that the second adopter 
has selected the mark with some design inimical to the interests of the 
first user, such as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to 
forestall the extension of his trade, or the like.”114  The court added 
                                                                                                               
 113 United Drug Co., v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918). 
 114 See id. at 101; see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 
(1916) (establishing the “tea rose” doctrine and stating that prior appropriation is “legally 
insignificant” in cases where the marks are used in separate markets). 
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that the right to a trademark grows out of its use in connection with 
an existing business and not by mere adoption.115  Thus, the Supreme 
Court established what is now called the Tea Rose/Rectanus doctrine. 
Essentially, the Tea Rose doctrine states that the first user of 
a common law trademark may not oust a later user’s good faith use 
of an infringing mark in a market where the first user’s products or 
services are not sold.116  Thus, between unregistered users, the 
priority of use in that geographic area controlled. Courts have 
repeatedly adopted the well-established Supreme Court rationale that 
the owner of a common-law mark may not “monopolize markets that 
his trade has never reached and where the mark signifies not his goods 
but those of another.”117 
The same rule may not hold if one of the marks is registered.  
Generally, even prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act, 
registration conferred nation-wide priority to use the mark.  An 
unregistered user of a mark was not entitled to exclude a registered 
owner of the mark from using it in a territory that would fall within 
the zone of “normal expansion of business.”  Under the Lanham Act 
registration of a mark provides constructive notice within the United 
States.118  Such constructive notice provides nationwide protection to 
registered marks, regardless of the areas in which the registrant 
actually uses the mark.119  The essential priority principles of the Tea-
Rose doctrine apply to all registered trademark owners with one 
important modification which provides that the owner of a registered 
mark has the right to expand its use into new areas of the territory 
unless a prior user had generated sufficient goodwill in that market 
prior to registration.  Thus, the priority of use within a territory 
determined rights within the territory. 
                                                                                                               
 115 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. at 404. 
 116 See National Ass’n for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area 
Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) where the court states that the 
Supreme Court established the Tea Rose/Rectanus. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore 
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100–01 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 
at 415 (1916) (stating that rules of appropriation are laxed when the mark is used in two 
different areas). 
 117 See National Ass’n for Healthcare Communications, Inc. v. Central Arkansas Area 
Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Hanover Star Milling, 240 
U.S. at 416). 
 118 15 U.S.C. § 1072. 
 119 Id. In doing so, it effectively eliminates good faith and lack of knowledge defenses 
otherwise available to a subsequent user. 
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Protecting such well-known marks from abroad should form 
an exception to the territoriality doctrine if the famous foreign marks 
doctrine is recognized.120  Basically, under the famous marks 
doctrine, considering the fame of the foreign mark, the question is 
whether the second user adopted the mark in good faith.  The United 
States, in Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Café,121  the first 
recognized the famous marks doctrine. “Maison Prunier,” was a Paris 
restaurant with a branch in London.  When a new restaurant was 
opened in New York City with a similar name, the owner sought to 
enjoin defendants’ use of the name even though it did not have 
operations in New York.  The appeals court sustained the ruling of 
the trial court.122  The court specifically highlighted the general rule 
of territoriality but noted that bad faith use of a famous foreign name 
by a second user formed an exception to the territoriality rule.  Fame 
of the mark became a relevant factor relevant to deciding whether the 
second user adopted the mark in good faith use and also justify using 
unfair competition principles.123  Thus, in the United States, arguably 
using unfair competition principles a mark may be entitled to 
protection in a country even if it was neither used nor registered 
provided it is well known among consumers in that country and there 
is clear proof of lack of bad faith appropriation of the mark.  It is 
worth adding here that some of these decisions have been based on 
state common law rather than under federal Lanham Act.124 
b) Travelling Americans need not know of all marks abroad! 
The following narrative examines how courts in the United 
States have dealt with cases where a well-known mark in a foreign 
country has been subjected to prior registration by a third party within 
the US.  It is important to appreciate that the federal Trademarks 
                                                                                                               
 120 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 29:4 (4th ed. 2008) (asserting that the famous marks doctrine is incorporated into United 
States domestic law through Lanham Act sections 43(a), 44(b), 44(h)). 
 121 Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Café, 159 Misc. 551, 557–61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1936). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. See also Kristin Zobel, The Famous Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-
Known Foreign Marks Receive Trademark Protection within the United States?, 19 DEPAUL 
J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 145 (2008) (discussing cases establishing trademark law). 
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Dilution Act defines fame and provides a set of criteria to determine 
fame of a mark.125 
That is, a well-known foreign mark is registered and used 
within the United States by a local person raising the issue of who is 
the prior user of the mark.  For example, in 1981, Larry Christman, a 
U.S. citizen and employee of a sportswear wholesaler, visited a 
Person’s Co.  retail store in Japan.126  The name Person’s was adopted 
in 1977 by Takaya Iwasaki for clothing in his native Japan. Two years 
later, Iwasaki formed Person’s Co., Ltd., a Japanese corporation, to 
market and distribute clothing items in retail stores located in 
Japan.127  On return, Christman developed designs for his own 
“PERSON’S” brand sportswear line based on the Person’s products 
he had purchased in Japan.128  By April 1984, Christman not only 
supplied clothes bearing the Person’s logo within the United States, 
he also registered the name for use on wearing apparel.129 
Meanwhile, Person’s became a well-known and highly 
respected brand in the Japanese fashion industry.130  When the 
Japanese company wanted to sell its products in the United States, 
they initiated an action to cancel Christman’s registration.  On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision that Christman was 
a “good faith” prior user of the mark in the United States even though 
it was clear that he had misappropriated a mark in use in a foreign 
country.  The Federal Circuit adopted the view that copying a mark 
in use in a foreign country is not per se an evidence of bad faith unless 
                                                                                                               
 125 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv); Lanham Act, § 43(c) also known as the 
Trademarks Dilution Revision Act, 2006 (TDRA). Under the TDRA, Under the TDRA, 
a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the US as a 
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner. In determining whether 
a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant 
factors, including the following: 
(i)The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, 
whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties. 
(ii)The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under 
the mark. 
(iii)The extent of actual recognition of the mark. 
(iv)Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 
20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
 
 126 Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 127 Id. at 1567. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Person’s Co., 900 F.2d at 1567. 
 130 Id. 
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the foreign mark is famous in the United States at that time the 
copying is undertaken and the mark is copied for the purpose of 
interfering with the prior user’s planned expansion into the United 
States.  “Christman’s conduct in appropriating and using the 
appellant’s mark in a market where he believed the Japanese 
manufacturer did not compete can hardly be considered unscrupulous 
commercial conduct.131” 
Essentially, use within the territory is the critical component 
to establish priority over a mark locally.  Thus, the territoriality 
principle, especially the way it is defined and applied in the United 
States, does not deter third parties to adopt, use and protect within the 
United States, trademarks that may be known and protected in 
another country.  Unlike India, which surprising attributes and deems 
travelling Indians possess exceptional knowledge of trademarks, the 
United States believes that expecting travelling Americans to know 
of marks in several countries seems unfair.  Hence, from a national 
perspective this seems like a fair determination although it does 
condone stealing relatively good marks from other countries under 
limited circumstances.  But, when considering the international 
requirements, the US expectations that a foreign mark owner 
interested in the US market has the burden to secure prior registration 
of the mark in the United States, as seen from the discussion in Grupo 
Gigante below, seems to go against basic national treatment 
obligations under Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement because it 
indirectly favors nationals against foreigners.132  From an 
international perspective, this poses an operational problem with 
well-known  marks that already enjoy a reputation and identity in 
foreign jurisdictions when they permeate into the United States, 
although the mark may not be protected in the United States.  This is 
especially true of marks that may be well known within large pockets 
of different immigrant communities but not generally well-known. 
c) Delineating the market to determine fame 
If the foreign mark enjoys a clear reputation in the United 
States before a local user appropriates the mark, the question is 
whether fame or territoriality establishes priority over the mark?  
                                                                                                               
 131 Person’s Co., 900 F.2d at 1570. 
 132 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3. 
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Interestingly, under contemporary trademarks law, even when a 
foreign mark enjoys a clear reputation within the United States, if it 
is not registered locally, the foreign trademark holder may lose 
priority over the mark. 
The Ninth circuit dealt with a case involving a large and well-
known Mexican grocery chain—Grupo Gigante—which has been 
operational in Mexico since 1962 but did not have a presence in the 
US.133  The name was appropriated by a Michael Dallo in 1996 to 
operate an American chain of grocery stores in a locality where 
shoppers were familiar with the Mexican mark.  Neither party had 
registered the mark federally.  Considering that the Mexican mark 
was well-known in the US, the question is should the Mexican owner 
be entitled to priority within the US based on the fame the mark 
acquired from its use in Mexico? 
The fame of the Grupo Gigante mark in Mexico and the 
knowledge of its mark amongst Mexican consumers in the California 
market should typically entitle the mark to protection to the name in 
the US.134  The defendants argued that the territoriality principle 
required that the mark be used within the United States and that the 
prior-US-user was entitled to protection even though he had 
essentially adopted the mark in the US with full knowledge of its 
fame in Mexico.  To its credit, the Ninth circuit recognized the 
existence of the famous marks doctrine and how it is juxta positioned 
over the territoriality doctrine.135  The court specifically clarified that 
§44 of the Lanham Act implements Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention.136  Article 10bis requires member countries “to assure to 
nationals of [other member countries] effective protection against 
unfair competition.”  The Ninth circuit court clarified that section 44 
of the Lanham Act implements Article 10(bis) of the Paris 
Convention by extending Lanham Act protection to foreign nationals 
to the extent necessary to satisfy the United States’ treaty 
obligations.137 
                                                                                                               
 133 Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1091–1092 (2004). 
 134 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1092. 
 135 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094; See also Fuji Photo Film Co., Inc. v. Shinohara 
Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (1985) (discussing the separation of trademark 
rights by country); see generally Zobel, supra note 124 (discussing the circuit confusion on 
this area of law). 
 136 See 15 U.S.C. § 1126; See also Paris Convention, supra note 4, art. 10(bis). 
 137 Id.; Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1099. 
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Grupo was also able to establish that its mark and its store was 
known (secondary reputation) to residents of the San Diego area.138  
The district court specifically found that there was sufficient 
secondary meaning for the mark in the San Diego area.  Yet, the court 
ruled that the presence of secondary meaning, which was the court’s 
manner of appreciating the fame of the foreign mark in the United 
States, alone in an area where the foreign user wishes to assert 
protection is insufficient to overcome the territoriality doctrine.  In 
addition to secondary meaning, the Ninth circuit required that district 
courts must be satisfied, by a “preponderance of the evidence, that a 
substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant American market 
is familiar with the foreign mark.”139  The court defined the term 
“relevant American market” as the geographic area where the 
defendant uses the alleged infringing mark.  In making this 
determination, the court required that factors such as the intentional 
copying of the mark by the defendant, and whether customers of the 
American firm are likely to think they are patronizing the foreign 
trademark owner should be considered.140  The court held that these 
factors may not necessarily be determinative although it held that they 
are particularly relevant to bear heavily on the risks of consumer 
confusion and fraud, which are the reasons for having a famous-mark 
exception to the territoriality doctrine.141 
From a global perspective, this decision poses a problem with 
marks that already enjoy a reputation and identity in foreign 
jurisdictions some of which may permeate within the United States, 
although the mark may not be protected in the United States.  This is 
especially true of marks that may be well known within large pockets 
of different immigrant communities but not generally well-known 
within the United States.  The decision essentially directs foreign 
mark owners interested in the US market have to carry the burden of 
registering the mark in the United States. 
This decision is unlike in India where in its zeal to recognize 
foreign marks, courts have repeatedly seemingly narrowed goodwill 
to what is recognized by the “travelling Indians” and to internet savvy 
Indians, which is a small class of the population of the country. 
                                                                                                               
 138 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094 n. 23, 24. 
 139 Id. at 1098. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
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In reality, the famous marks doctrine has always had a 
tumultuous recognition in the US.  The discussion in the initial part 
of the paper of the 1959 decision in Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 142 
from the state court New York is a case to the point.  While the Ninth 
circuit agreed that famous foreign marks can gain exclusive rights 
even in territories where it is not in use, it struggled with defining 
how famous or how well-known the foreign mark must be within the 
US to get protection. 143 
d) US struggles to create an exception to foreign prior users of 
well-known marks within the US 
Similarly, despite what it preaches to the rest of the world, the 
United States struggles to compromise on the priority principle to 
grant recognition to famous foreign marks not used in the territory.  
For example, in Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento 
de Barcelona,144  the court specifically noted that the United States 
courts do not entertain actions seeking to enforce trademark rights 
that exist only under foreign law.  Similarly, in Almacenes Exito S.A. 
v. El Gallo Meat Market, Inc.,145 the court noted that the famous 
marks doctrine had no place in federal law and that it was up to the 
Congress to carefully prescribe the bases for federal trademark claims 
for famous foreign marks.  While other cases like Empresa Cubana 
del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.,146 opines that federal law embodies 
principles of famous marks doctrine under or under 43(a),147 it will 
not be a stretch to state that the territoriality principle remains 
fundamental to federal trademark law in the United States and that 
recognition of a famous foreign marks exception would be well-
cemented perhaps only with adequate Congressional action.  In gist, 
the tendency is to provide rights to the local user who uses the mark 
first within the US.  This is more so, if the US user has managed to 
register the foreign mark first in the US. 
                                                                                                               
 142 Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757 (1959). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 
628 (4th Cir. 2003) (“United States courts do not entertain actions seeking to enforce 
trademark rights that exist only under foreign law”). 
 145 Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327–328 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 146 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462 (2nd Cir. 2005). 
 147 15 U.S.C. §1125. 
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Part IV 
A Comparative Perspective: India finally wises up, thanks to Prius! 
Given how amenable the India courts have been to recognize 
and protect US marks are considered well-known in India, even when 
the marks may not qualify as famous within the US, the part 
highlights how the United States has treated a trademark from India. 
This case is taken as a specific example because the earlier part 
demonstrates the significant recognition India has awarded to foreign 
trademarks, of which the US trademark owners have been the biggest 
beneficiaries.  It is worth recalling that India specifically derogated 
from the priority and territoriality doctrines to bestow recognition for 
foreign trademarks. 
a) How India treats US marks 
In 2007, the second circuit in the United States decided a case 
that particularly allowed and seemingly even encouraged US citizens 
to knowingly misappropriate famous foreign trademarks, with a 
reputation in the United States.148  The case in question, being, ITC 
Limited v. Punchgini,149  related to the acquisition of the name 
Bukhara, which name was internationally used, known and voted one 
of the world’s fifty best restaurants by London-based Restaurant 
magazine.150  In that dispute, the plaintiff ITC Limited (ITC) was an 
Indian corporation, which operated the world famous BUKHARA 
restaurant since 1977.151  In 1987, ITC Limited (ITC) obtained a 
federal U.S. trademark registration for BUKHARA for restaurant 
services but the New York restaurant closed on December 17, 1991, 
and on August 28, 1997, ITC cancelled its Chicago franchise. In 1999 
the defendants, who had worked either in the New Delhi restaurant 
or the New York BUKHARA restaurant, formed a company with the 
goal of opening a restaurant in New York and named it the 
BUKHARA GRILL.  The defendants’ restaurant also mimicked the 
logos, decor, staff uniforms, wood-slab menus, and red-checkered 
                                                                                                               
 148 ITC v. Punchgini INC., 482 F.3d 135 (2nd Cir. 2007). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 143. 
 151 Id. 
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customer bibs of the plaintiff’s restaurants.152  ITC sued the 
defendants in federal court in New York claiming that defendants’ 
use of a similar mark for a restaurant in New York constituted 
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising in 
violation of federal and state law.  On appeal, the Second Circuit in 
2007 affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant on 
ITC’s federal and state trademark infringement claims on the grounds 
that the ITC depended on the “famous marks” doctrine, which the 
court found was not recognized under current federal trademark 
law.153 
The second circuit in considering whether ITC had priority 
over the mark in the United States, held that “a foreign mark holder 
generally may not assert priority rights under federal law, even if a 
United States competitor has knowingly appropriated that mark for 
his own use.”154  The second circuit, citing Grupo Gigante, 
emphasized the role of territoriality and limited the protection to 
foreign mark holders to rights specified in section 44(b).155  In 
refusing to recognize the famous mark doctrine, the court held that 
foreign holders must have registered the mark and use it to be entitled 
to similar protections.  In effect, the second circuit allowed a 
defendant who knowingly misappropriated a mark that is 
internationally famous on the ground that the United States “does not 
recognize the famous marks doctrine.”156 
The next section examines why the United States, of all 
countries, need to recognize famous foreign trademarks to avoid 
looking hypocritical. 
b) India wises-up to follow US reciprocity 
Arguably after tending towards recognizing as famous marks 
that would not pass the fame threshold within the country where the 
mark acquired fame—Rainforest Café, being a great example157—
India finally issued an opinion that considered famous foreign marks 
in the context of traditional principles of priority and territoriality. 
                                                                                                               
 152 Id. at 144. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 156. 
 155 Id. at 159; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 156 See ITC, 482 F.3d at 144. 
 157 Rainforest Café Inc v. Rainforest Café and Ors., (2001) 91 DLT 508 (India); 
Rainforest Café Inc v. Rainforest Café and Ors., 2001 (21) PTC 353 (Del). 
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In the earlier discussion, this paper mentioned the 2004 the 
Indian Supreme Court’s cautionary words involving Milmet Oftho 
Industries,158 that a foreign corporation should not be permitted to 
throttle an Indian company, where adoption of a mark by the Indian 
company is genuine and first in the market.  In 2017, the Supreme 
Court of India considered a case involving an allegation of passing 
off action initiated by Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha 
(‘Toyota’),159 regarding the mark Prius, which it has been using 
extensively abroad for its first commercial hybrid car.  The court held 
that Toyota had not established goodwill or reputation of its mark in 
India as of 2001.160  Ruling in favor of the defendant, M/s Prius Auto 
Industries Ltd. (‘Prius Auto’), a local Indian company, the court 
based its decision on the principle of territoriality of trademarks.161  It 
is notable that in 1997 and thereafter, Toyota launched the Prius in 
different global markets although the car was first launched in India 
only in 2010.162  Until 2009 Toyota had not filed for registration of 
the ‘PRIUS’ mark in India.  The defendant, Prius Auto, on the other 
hand, justified its adoption of the mark PRIUS on the ground that it 
was the first in India to manufacture add-on chrome plated 
accessories in India.  The defendant had obtained registration of the 
said mark in the year 2002 and had been continuously using the same 
since the year 2001.  Prius Auto, therefore, contended that Toyota 
could not claim goodwill in respect of use of the mark PRIUS for cars 
in India.163 
Relying on a decision of the U.K. Supreme Court in Starbucks 
vs. British Sky Broadcasting164 the Supreme Court endorsed the 
findings that “ . . . no trader can complain of passing-off as against 
him in any territory . . . in which he has no customers, nobody who is 
                                                                                                               
 158 Milmet Oftho Industries and Ors. Vs. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624 (India). 
 159 Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. M/S Prius Auto Industries Limited, Civil Appeal 
No. 5375-5377 of 2017 [hereinafter Toyota Jidosha]. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See Katherine Lyon Dayton, India: Supreme Court Applies Territoriality Principle 
and Eviscerates Toyota’s Prius Victory, MONDAQ (last updated Apr. 13, 2018), 
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/691640/Trademark/Supreme+Court+Applies+Territorialit
y+Principle+And+Eviscerates+Toyotas+Prius+Victory [https://perma.cc/Y9HE-LZJV] 
(describing the Supreme Court of Delhi’s adoption of the “Territoriality Principle”). 
 162 Toyota Jidosha, at ¶ 5–6. 
 163 Toyota Jidosha, at ¶¶ 4–10. 
 164 See generally Starbucks (HK) Ltd and another v. British Sky Broadcasting Group 
plc and others, [2015] UKSC 31, https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2013-0274.html 
[https://perma.cc/NH77-VU5L]. 
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in trade relation with him.”  The Supreme Court of India noted that, 
“the overwhelming judicial and academic opinion all over the globe 
seemed to be in favor of the territoriality principle,” which requires 
the court “to determine if there has been any spill-over reputation and 
goodwill associated with the mark of the claimant.”165  The court 
added that Toyota’s delay in initiating an action against a defendant 
cannot be allowed to prejudice the defendant, who continuously used 
the registered mark to market its goods during the inordinately long 
period of silence maintained by the plaintiff.166  The decision of the 
Indian Supreme court also indirectly will ensure prompt introduction 
of such products within India. 167 
It is important to note that India continues to undergo changes 
after the Prius decision with reference to this area of law.  There is no 
evidence that ITC decision of the United States was the only reason 
contributing to this changed thinking in India.  But, the ITC decision 
was widely circulated in India and generally perceived as the US 
imposing a rule that is does not follow locally on India through the 
USTR’s process.168  Perhaps, the ITC decision was an influencer—
perhaps it was not.  Either way, the Indian Supreme Court decision is 
commendable for carefully weighing traditional trademark principles 
such as territoriality & priority in the context of protection for famous 
foreign trademarks. 
CONCLUSION 
The lesson here is for both India and the United States.  As far 
as the United States is concerned, the bottom line is, the treatment 
meted out for famous foreign trademarks in the United States does 
not comport with what the United States expects when foreign marks 
are adopted by third party prior users in other countries.  Considering 
                                                                                                               
 165 Toyota Jidosha, at ¶¶ 28–29 (citing that a Hong Kong company had no trademark 
protection claim for use of the mark in the UK). 
 166 See Shamnad Basheer, Toyota Loses Trademark Battle over Prius at Indian Supreme 
Court, SPICYIP (Dec. 15, 2017), https://spicyip.com/2017/12/breaking-news-passing-off-by-
prius-reputation-must-be-proved-rules-indian-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/SLJ7-
QSFT] (describing the Indian Supreme Court’s decision to view “IP rights [as] ‘territorial’ 
and not ‘global’”). 
 167 Id. 
 168 See, e.g., Dhananjay Mahapatra, ITC Loses Bhukara Case in the US, TIMES OF INDIA 
(Aug. 3, 2007, 3:03 AM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/ITC-
loses-Bukhara-copyright-case-in-US/articleshow/2251999.cms [https://perma.cc/966V-
C8HA] (describing the ruling and reactions to it). 
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that the United States expects other nations to protect famous 
American trademarks and that the office of the USTR specifically 
cites countries that refuse to afford reciprocal protection to famous 
foreign marks, it is imperative that the United States adopts a line of 
jurisprudence it preaches to other countries.  By not recognizing 
famous foreign marks, American courts actively encourage what in 
other countries (and if perpetrated by foreigners) would be termed as 
“unfair business practices” when perpetrated by Americans.  In 
essence, the effect of the decision from the United States is that 
Americans can steal, misappropriate and use famous foreign marks 
so long as they manage to register such marks first within the US and 
continue to use it.  But, if the same scenario occurs abroad, the United 
States decries it and terms it as “unfair trade.” 
As far as India is concerned, there is no need to recognize 
every foreign mark as famous just because it is “foreign.”  There are 
plenty of marks that are in use within the United States that may not 
qualify as famous under the Trademarks Dilution statute of the United 
States.  In any case, it is arguable that Indians who travel abroad or 
use the internet alone as a class represent the Indian market.  That 
said, India’s read of these cases has shown a strong trajectory towards 
weighing in traditional principles of territoriality, use, priority into 
the framework for recognition of well-known trademarks and that is 
commendable. 
Overall, in a globalized world, where the US has a belligerent 
trade posture in trade as it does currently, it may not be long before 
other countries learn extend the exact same treatment to American 
famous trademarks. In any case, it is clear from the ITC v. Punchgini 
decision that “an absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark 
exception could promote consumer confusion and fraud.”169 
 
                                                                                                               
 169 See Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that a famous mark exception exists against the territoriality principle). 
